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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
BENJAMIN MATTHEW NUNLEY, : Case No. 20000196-C A 
Defendant/ Appellant. : Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from a restitution order entered following his judgment and 
conviction for attempted aggravated assault, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 & -5-103 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
May a court increase an order of restitution if, after entry of the judgment and 
conviction, the defendant requests a full restitution hearing and the resulting, 
uncontradicted evidence establishes that the prior restitution order was incorrect? 
An appellate court will uphold a trial court's restitution order unless the order 
exceeds that legally permissible or the trial court otherwise abused its discretion. State v. 
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah App. 1997). Because defendant failed to object to 
the legality of the restitution order, appellate consideration of the issue is waived. State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987) (recognizing general preservation requirement); 
State v. Snyder, 141 P.2d AM, All (Utah App. 1987) (failure to object to restitution order 
waives appellate challenge). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
If this Court determines that appellate review is not waived, the following 
provisions, copied in Addendum D, are determinative of the merits: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999) - Definitions - Sentences or combination 
of sentences allowed - Civil penalties - Restitution - Hearing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (1999) - Suspension of sentence - Pleas held in 
abeyance - Probation - Supervision - Presentence investigation - Standards 
- Confidentiality - Terms and conditions - Restitution - Termination, 
revocation, modification, or extension - Hearings - Electronic Monitoring. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999) (R. 1-2). On November 17, 1999, pursuant to a 
plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to a reduced charge of attempted aggravated assault, a 
Class A misdemeanor (R. 20-22). On January 11, 2000, the court sentenced defendant to 
365 days in jail, but then suspended incarceration and placed defendant on probation, 
upon condition that he pay $16,000.00 in restitution and attend anger management classes 
(R. 41-43; and R. 65: 16-20). See Addendum C for copy of Judgment and Conviction. 
Defendant did not object to or appeal the judgment. 
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Thirty-five days later, on February 15, 2000, defendant requested a restitution 
hearing, which request was granted (R. 44, 64). Based on the subsequent hearing's 
uncontradicted, documented evidence that the victim's pecuniary damages amounted to 
$19,646.15, and not $16,000.00 as reported in the presentence report, the trial court 
ordered defendant to pay the increased amount (R. 64: 4-21). See Addendum A for copy 
of Restitution Order.1 
Defendant appeals the February order (R. 46). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant: "I made a bad decision and got a baseball bat 
from the car and struck [the victim] in the leg." 
On March 16, 1999, defendant got into an argument with Joe Pilcher, a driver who 
allegedly "cut [defendant] off as defendant and his son drove home (R. 2, 20; see also 
Presentence Report [PSR] at 2-4). During the ensuing altercation, defendant retrieved his 
son's baseball bat from his car and hit Mr. Pilcher with the bat on the leg and knee (id.). 
Mr. Pilcher required medical treatment and was, out-of-work for six weeks (R. 64: 4-8; R. 
65: 4-7; PSR at 4). 
Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to a Class A misdemeanor. 
Before sentencing, defendant admitted that hitting the victim with a baseball bat was a 
1
 The record on appeal does not contain a copy of the February 22, 2000, 
restitution order, however, defendant has attached a copy of the order to his brief. See 
Brief of Appellant [Br.App.], Addendum A. The State does not contest the accuracy of 
defendant's copy. 
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"terrible choice and something that is not acceptable for any reason under any 
circumstances" (PSR at 3). Defendant was 
completely sorry this took place and I would willingly & gladly like to 
appologize [sic] to [the victim] and his family and will do anything I can to 
try to redeem myself for any suffering I have caused. I truly want him to 
know I am sincerely sorry and I am totaly [sic] ashamed to know I am 
responsible for the trouble I have caused. 
(id.). 
The presentence report stated that the victim's undocumented pecuniary damages 
were $16,000, estimated at $500.00 for medical expenses and $15,000.00 for lost 
earnings as a plumbing contractor (PSR at 5; R. 65: 4-5). At sentencing, defendant said 
he could make full restitution based on his meat-cutter's job, which paid $14.33 an hour 
for a 56-72 hour-week or approximately $3,210.00 to $4,127.00 monthly (R. 65: 6-7). 
Despite defendant's apparent remorse, Adult Probation and Parole recommended 
incarceration for the full statutory term due to defendant's admitted inability to control his 
anger and his prior history of assault-related offenses (PSR at 17). The trial court agreed 
that defendant "deserve[d] jail," but was "torn" by a desire to make the victim "as whole 
as I can" (R. 65: 16). Because incarceration would hinder defendant's ability to "get Mr. 
Pilcher the money he deserved" (R. 64: 17), the court imposed but suspended the jail 
sentence and placed defendant on probation, upon condition that he attend anger 
management classes and pay $1000.00 a month towards the estimated $16,000.00 
restitution (R. 64: 17-20). See Addendum C (Judgment). Defendant did not object or 
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request a restitution hearing during the sentencing proceedings; nor did he appeal from 
the judgment and conviction. 
The victim: "And that's figuring low, too. I've been giving 
Mr. Nunley the benefit of the doubt the whole way." 
On February 15, 2000, some thirty-five days after entry of the criminal judgment, 
defendant requested a full restitution hearing (R. 44). Despite the untimeliness of the 
motion,2 the trial court granted defendant's request. 
One week later, on February 22, 2000, an evidentiary hearing was held (R. 64). 
The victim testified and produced documents which established his lost earnings at 
$19,125.00, and his out-of-pocket medical expenses at $521.15 (R. 64: 4-16, 21). In 
providing a detailed explanation for the higher figures, some $3646.15 over the 
undocumented estimate contained in the presentence report, the victim explained that he 
was "figuring low" and "giving Mr. Nunley the benefit of the doubt the whole way" (R. 
64: 16). Defendant did not call any witnesses or produce any evidence which 
contradicted the victim's testimony (R. 64: 21-26). Nor did defense counsel argue against 
the $19,646.15 total figure or assert any legal reason why the trial court could not adjust 
the restitution amount upwards. Instead, following the prosecutor's request for the higher 
figure to be imposed, defense counsel said he would "submit it" (R. 64: 21). 
The court then queried defendant directly about when his first payment was due 
2
 See discussion, infra at 10 n.4. 
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(R. 64: 21), after which the following exchange took place: 
Court: Any question you have? 
Defendant: I - I'm confused on the whole - the whole reason for this 
hearing. I was already sentenced to $16,000 -
Court: You were. 
Defendant: - and now it's changing to the 19-something. 
Court: 19,646.15. So, the question is? 
Defendant: So, my amount - the amount of money I'm supposed to be 
paying back has changed now? 
Court: Un huh. And what is your question? 
Defendant: I have a problem with that because -
Court: Well, do you have a question or just want to make a statement? 
Defendant: I want to make a whole lot of statements. 
Court: Okay. Go ahead. 
Defendant: I talked to two acquaintances of mine, one is a - has his 
master's in plumbing, one owns his own plumbing company. 
(R. 64: 21-22). Defendant continued to explain that his "acquaintances" thought the 
victim's invoices might be "fabricated and there could be other employees doing the 
work" (R. 64: 22). When the court asked where these witnesses were, defendant 
responded that he did not know they needed to testify at the hearing (R. 64: 22-24). The 
court explained that it would not accept defendant's unsworn summary of what others 
might say, advised defendant to consult with his attorney, and said that if they then 
wished, they could "notice up" a hearing to present "contradictory evidence" (R. 64: 26).3 
Otherwise, the court felt "comfortable with the substantialness [sic] of the proof 
3
 The court also rejected defendant's request for the victim's tax return because 
Mr. Pilcher testified that the March-April period, during which his* unemployment 
occurred, was his busiest time and "carried" him through the slower winter months (R. 
64: 6-9, 25-26). His total yearly earnings were, therefore, not determinative (R. 64: 25-
26). 
6 
presented at the hearing (R. 64: 25). See Addendum B for transcript of this exchange. 
Defense counsel remained silent and never requested a further evidentiary hearing. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant does not dispute that the victim suffered $19,646.15 in pecuniary 
damages, or that, at minimum, he owes the victim $16,000.00 in restitution. The only 
issue is whether, having relied on the undocumented estimate of $16,000.00, the court 
could thereafter increase restitution by $3646.15 based upon the uncontradicted, 
documented evidence presented at the restitution hearing. The answer is "yes." A 
defendant cannot demand a restitution hearing, only to reject its adverse consequences. 
Moreover, the issue is not properly before this Court. Defendant presented no 
factual evidence to counter the victim's testimony that he suffered $19646.15 in damages 
as a result of defendant's criminal conduct. Nor did defendant present any legal reason 
why the court could not increase the amount of restitution based on the undisputed 
evidence. Having failed to challenge the restitution order in the trial court, defendant is 
now precluded from attacking its legality on appeal. 
In sum, defendant failed to preserve his meritless argument. 
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ARGUMENT 
A TRIAL COURT IS NOT BOUND BY A PRIOR ESTIMATE OF 
PECUNIARY DAMAGES IF, FOLLOWING A RESTITUTION 
HEARING, THE UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES 
THA T THE PRIOR ESTIMA TE WAS INCORRECT 
A. Defendant did not preserve his appellate claim. 
This Court will not consider claims raised for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987). Here, defendant did not preserve a challenge to 
the legality of the trial court's February restitution order and, therefore, appellate review 
is waived. State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417,421 (Utah App. 1987). 
Utah's statutory scheme provides ample opportunity for a criminal defendant to 
challenge a restitution order. Prior to sentencing, a defendant is provided a copy of the 
presentence report, which necessarily contains not only an ":mate of the pecuniary 
damages incurred by the victim, but also a recommendation regarding payment. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 77-18-l(5)(c) & -(6)(a) (1999). At sentencing, a defendant may challenge 
any inaccuracy in the presentence report, Utah Code § 77-18-l(6)(b), and may present any 
"testimony, evidence, or information . . . [ he ] . . . desires . . . concerning the appropriate 
sentence, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7). Further, a defendant "at the time of sentencing" 
may demand a full evidentiary hearing to challenge the "imposition, amount, or 
distribution of the restitution" ordered. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) (1999). See 
Addendum D for copies of statutes cited. Failure to timely object to the amount of 
restitution constitutes waiver. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(b) (failure to object to 
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presentence report at time of sentencing constitutes waiver); Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 
1017, 1029 (Utah 1996) (a defendant is not entitled to a restitution hearing unless he 
timely requests one at the time of sentencing); Snyder, 747 P.2d at 421 (failure to object 
to restitution order below waives appellate review). 
Here, defendant did not object to the initial undocumented estimate of $16,000.00 
contained in the presentence report (PSR at 3-4). To the contrary, defendant agreed that 
the victim had suffered out-of-pocket medical expenses and six weeks of lost earnings as 
an independent plumbing contractor during the "busiest" time of the year (R. 65: 4-11). 
Nor did defendant challenge the propriety of the judge's announced desire to make the 
victim "as whole as I can" (R. 65: 16). 
Instead, some thirty-five days after sentencing, defendant requested an evidentiary 
hearing pursuant to section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) (R. 44). Despite the untimeliness of the 
motion and its lack of specificity, the court granted defendant's request (R. 64).4 
4
 A defendant has no right to a restitution hearing when he fails to timely request 
one at sentencing. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e); Monson, 928 P.2d at 1029; Snyder, 
747 P.2d at 421. A court may, however, cure an untimely claim of error by reaching the 
merits of the claim in a post-judgment motion. State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 
1992) (per curium) ("trial court in effect reopened the trial when it held an evidentiary 
hearing" after a bench trial); State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991) 
(same). Here, the hearing was granted without objection and, therefore, the State does not 
raise defendant's untimeliness on appeal. 
Furthermore, considering the untimeliness of defendant's hearing request would 
result in an unjustified windfall for defendant: without the untimely motion, there would 
be no evidentiary hearing, and no increased order of restitution. A party may not, 
however, gain advantage through invited error. State v. Rudolph, 2000 UT App. 155, 
H15, 3 P.3d 192 (citing State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989)). 
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At the hearing one week later, defendant presented no witnesses or documentation 
to counter the victim's detailed explanation of his losses. In fact, when the court sought 
counsel's response to the higher restitution figure, defense counsel simply "submitted" 
the issue (R. 64:21). 
Defendant now claims that he - as opposed to his counsel - preserved the issue 
when he personally engaged in a colloquy with the court. See Br.App. at 2, 6-7. But a 
review of the exchange establishes that defendant only asked, "So, my amount - the 
amount of money I'm supposed to be paying back has changed now?", and then opined 
that the victim may have "fabricated" the documentation relied upon in reaching the 
higher amount (R. 64: 21-22). The remainder of the exchange centered on defendant's 
failure to have his "witnesses" at the restitution hearing and the trial court's offer to hold 
a future hearing so that defendant could present the testimony of those witnesses, an offer 
defendant never accepted (R. 64: 23-26). At no point, did defendant or his counsel claim 
that the trial court was without legal authority to enter the increased restitution order. See 
Addendum B for complete exchange. 
This Court, therefore, should refuse to consider defendant's claim for the first time 
on appeal and should summarily affirm the February restitution order. 
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B. Even if the issue were preserved, the trial court acted properly in 
increasing the amount of restitution based on the uncontradicted 
hearing evidence. 
Even if the merits of defendant's claim were preserved, his argument is without 
merit. The trial court properly increased the amount of restitution owed based on the 
uncontradicted hearing evidence. 
Utah law accords an order of restitution "'separate legal effect that parallels] 
probation in sentencing and judgment.'" State v. Nones, 2000 UT App 211, [^7, 399 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 14 (quoting State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah App. 1992), cert 
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993)). A restitution order may be "enforced as a probation 
condition, in accord with section 77-18-1, 'and as a separate and independent component 
of the court's judgment and the defendant's original sentence under Utah Code Annotated 
sections 76-3-201(3) & -201.1.'" Id. at %9 (quoting Dickey, 841 P.2d at 1207). As such, 
an order of restitution in a criminal case serves the "dual purposes" of "compensating the 
victim and repaying society." Id. at Tf 14. 
Utah courts do not view restitution as punishment. Monson, 928 P.2d at 1026; 
Stilling v. Board of Pardons, 933 P.2d 391, 392 (Utah App. 1997). Instead, it is a "civil 
penalty whose purpose is entirely remedial, i.e., to compensate victims for the harm 
caused by a defendant and whose likely intent is to spare victims the time, expense and 
emotional difficulties of separate civil litigation to recover their damages from the 
defendant." Monson, 928 P.2d at 1027. Accord Nones, 2000 UT App 211, [^15 (intent of 
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Utah's restitution scheme is to ensure that victims "receive compensation for damages 
caused by defendant's crimes"). Cf. State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 
1992) (purpose of restitution is penal as well as compensatory); Dickey, 841 P.2d at 1209 
(purpose of restitution is "multifaceted," with penal, rehabilitative, and compensatory 
aspects). By limiting a trial court's power to order restitution to "that amount which is 
necessary to compensate a victim for losses caused by the defendant," section 76-3-201 
and its related provisions ensure that "restitution serves only its compensatory purpose." 
Monson, 928 P.2d at 1027. 
Here, defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in increasing 
restitution following the restitution hearing. Defendant contends that once the court 
entered the January Judgment and Conviction order, which directed defendant to pay 
$16,000 in restitution, the trial court only had the authority to decrease the amount of 
restitution following the February evidentiary hearing but was prohibited from increasing 
it. See Br. App. 10-13. Even though defendant sought reconsideration by requesting a 
hearing, he now argues that the resulting order constituted an abuse of discretion. He also 
argues that any increase should be barred as a "matter of policy" because it may "chill" 
the exercise of a defendant's right to a hearing. Id. Both contentions are incorrect. 
Defendant relies solely on a Washington state case for the proposition that the trial 
court abused its discretion in conforming the restitution order to the hearing evidence. In 
State v. Tindal, 748 P.2d 695, 697 (Wash. App. 1988), a restitution order was reversed 
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after the appellate court determined that the "evidence [did] not establish the amount of 
the victim's loss at the figure chosen by the trial judge." Contrary to defendant's 
assertion, see Br.App. at 11, the Washington Court of Appeals did not hold that any prior 
estimate of restitution must be taken as "fact" and never thereafter modified. Instead, the 
appellate court recognized that Tindal stipulated to a set amount of restitution in the plea 
agreement and, therefore, that amount was "fact" unless disproved by a preponderance of 
evidence. Tindal, 748 P.2d at 696-97. Despite this "fact," the Washington court 
concluded that the record did not establish "exactly what figure" was supported by the 
evidence and, therefore, remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 697. 
Unlike Tindal, the record in this case establishes the "exact" amount of undisputed 
damages incurred as a result of defendant's criminal conduct. While the presentence 
report reflected a figure of only $16,000.00, that figure was never incorporated into 
defendant's plea agreement. Instead, as reflected in the presentence report, the 
$16,000.00 figure represented only the victim's undocumented estimate of his damages. 
In contrast, after defendant challenged the undocumented estimate, sworn testimony and 
documented evidence established that the prior estimate was wrong - the true amount of 
pecuniary damages was $19,646.15. 
Defendant's second claim similarly lacks legal support. Citing State v. Sorenson, 
639 P.2d 179 (Utah 1981), defendant asserts that permitting an upward adjustment 
impermissibly "chills" the exercise of his right to a hearing. But like defendant's 
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misplaced reliance on Tindal, Sorenson is inapplicable to this case. 
Sorenson involved Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1999), a statute which strictly 
prohibits imposition of a greater sentence once a conviction has been set aside on direct 
review. See Addendum D for copy of statute. Broader than the federal or state due 
process provisions, section 76-3-405 
prevents the Utah constitutional right to appeal.. . from being impaired "by 
imposing on a defendant who demonstrates the error of his conviction the 
risk that he may be penalized with a harsher sentence for having done so." 
Sorenson, 639 P.2d at 180 (quoting Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 343 (Utah 1980)). See 
also State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^ 73, 979 P.2d 799 (Utah rule ensures that "basic 
constitutional right to appeal" is protected). 
But by its terms, section 76-3-405 only applies when a "conviction or sentence has 
been set aside on direct review or on collateral attack." See Addendum D. In contrast, a 
restitution hearing is part of the original sentencing proceedings. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-
3-201 & 77-18-1 (Addendum D). And, while a defendant may have a constitutional right 
to be heard at sentencing, State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 358-59 (Utah 1993), he has only 
a statutory right to a restitution hearing. State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712, 715 (Utah App. 
1992) (recognizing section 76-3-201 (4)(e)'s grant of a hearing but refusing to determine 
any separate constitutional right). Moreover, a defendant has "no accrued right to a 
sentence that exclude[s] restitution," for an order of restitution does not "increase or make 
more burdensome" a previously imposed criminal sentence. Monson, 928 P.2d at 1026. 
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See also Stilling, 933 P.2d at 392-93 (same). For these reasons, neither Sorenson nor 
section 76-3-405 bar a trial court from increasing a restitution order following a 
defendant-requested restitution hearing. 
* * * 
In sum, defendant requested and received an accurate determination of the victim's 
pecuniary damages. That those damages were higher than originally reported does not 
undermine their legal or factual validity. To the contrary, having pursued the evidentiary 
course, defendant must now accept its lawful consequences. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant did not preserve a challenge to the restitution order and, therefore, 
appellate review is waived. Even if the issue were preserved, the order is proper. On 
either ground, the February restitution order should be summarily affirmed. 
DATED this /6S#day of August, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney Genera l^^ . .^ 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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Addendum A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT MURRAY COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
va. 
BENJAMIN MATTHEW NUNLEY, 
Defendant. 
: MINUTES 
: RESTITUTION HEARING 
Case NO: 991200735 FS 
Judges MICHAEL K. BURTON 
Date: February 22, 2000 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lindav 
Prosecutor: WALSH, DAVID 
Defendant 
Defendant*s Attorney(a): HEINEMAN, ROBERT K 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: October 11, 1971 
Audio 
Tape Number: 00-128 Tape Count: 650 
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED ASSAULT (amended) -
Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/17/1999 Guilty Plea 
HEARING 
COUNT: 650 
JOE PILCHER, VICTIM, SWORN AND TESTIFIES ON STATE BEHALF. STATE 
EXHIBIT 1 (INVOICES) WERE MARKED, OFFERED AND IDENTIFIED BY VICTIM. 
COUNT: 134)0 
STATE REDIRECT OF JOB PILCHER 
COUNT: 1110 
DEFT CROSS EXAMINATION OF VICTIM. STATE WITHDRAWS EXHIBIT. 
COUNT: 1700 
COURT ORDERS RESTITUTION DUE IN AMOUNT OF $19125.00 FOR WAGES AND 
PROFIT LOST, $521.00 MEDICAL FOR TOTAL: $19646.15 
Page l 
Case No: 991200735 
Date: Feb 22, 2000 
COUNT: I960 
DEPT'S STATEMENT TO COURT AND OBJECTION TO AMOUNT DUE. COURT 
ADVISES DBPT TO HAVE HIS ATTORNEY MOTION THIS UP AGAIN, IP 
NECESSARY. 
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Addendum B 
MR. WALSH: Adding those two, 19,416. 
THE COURT: Mr. Heineman, your 
thoughts? 
MR. HEINEMAN: Submit it, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. As I do the math, 
I took the 12,750 and multiplied by one-and-a-half, I got 
19,125 as his lost wages and lost income, and then add to 
that the out-of-pocket of 521.15, I got 19,646.15. 
Mr. Nunley, if I recall right, your first 
payment of a thousand was coming in the end of this 
month; right? 
Any question you have? 
MR. NUNLEY: I—I'm confused on the 
whole—the whole reason for this hearing. I was already 
sentenced to $16,000— 
THE COURT: You were. 
MR. NUNLEY: —and now it's changing 
to the 19-something. 
THE COURT: 19,646.15. 
So, the question is? 
MR. NUNLEY: So, my amount—the 
amount ~of money I'm supposed to be paying back has 
changed now? 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
And what is your question? 
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MR. NUNLEY: I have a problem with 
that because— 
THE COURT: Well, do you have a 
question or just want to make a statement? 
MR. NUNLEY: I want to make a whole 
lot of statements. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
MR. NUNLEY: I talked to two 
acquaintances of mine, one is a—has his master's in 
plumbing, one owns his own plumbing company. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. NUNLEY: I—I talked to them 
about this situation and they said there's no way that— 
that that amount is—is actual, that these invoices could 
be fabricated and there could be other employees doing 
the work. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. NUNLEY: There's a lot of— 
THE COURT: Where—where are your 
knowledgeable friends today? 
MR. NUNLEY: They can come in and 
testify, I asked—I asked them if they would, they said 
yes. I didn't know if they needed to be here today. I 
have their—their names and number. I don't mean to be 
rude— 
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THE COURT: How—how did you imagine 
I'd know what they knew? 
MR. NUNLEY: Pardon me? 
THE COURT: I know what Mr. Pilcher 
knows 'cause he speaks, I listen, I understand. 
MR. NUNLEY: Okay. 
THE COURT: You have these people 
that I've never seen, heard or had anything to do with 
and you want me to know what they know. I don't 
understand how you think I could do that. 
MR. NUNLEY: Well— 
THE COURT: Maybe you could explain 
that to me. 
MR. NUNLEY: —my point is—is that 
how can—how can—I have a whole list of these people 
here that I've talked to— 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. NUNLEY: —that are plumbers, own 
plumbing companies, that are— 
THE COURT: Let me say it one more 
time for you, so you'll understand. 
I haven't heard from them and unless I hear 
from them, how will I know what they know? 
MR. NUNLEY: Well, can I have these 
people come in then? 
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THE COURT: Well, why—I don't 
understand why they aren't here today? 
MR. NUNLEY: I didn't know they had 
to be here today. 
THE COURT: Well, when did you think 
we were talking about this? 
When did you imagine that we would be hearing 
from them? 
MR. NUNLEY: I was—I was wondering 
if this— 
THE COURT: If not today, when did 
you think it would happen? 
MR. NUNLEY: I don't know, I didn't— 
I don't know how—how the Court process works as far as 
getting people to come and testify or anything like that. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. So, are you 
saying you didn't know it was today, you had no idea when 
it would be? 
MR. NUNLEY: Well, I knew—I knew I 
would be here today. I didn't know— 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. NUNLEY: I didn't know this would 
be like this or people would be getting up on the stand 
or anything like that. I had—I don't know a whole lot 
about all the court procedure for that. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. So, what is it you 
2 want from me now? 
3 MR. NUNLEY: I would like--I would 
4 like to see more substantial proof of— 
5 THE COURT: Well, I'm comfortable 
6 with the substantialness (sic) of the proof; so if you 
7 have contradictory proof; is that what you're trying to 
8 say? I've got somebody who will tell you a different 
9 story? 
10 MR. NUNLEY: Right. 
11 THE COURT: Yeah. Well, I—I'm—I'm 
12 happy to listen to them, so you and your attorney maybe 
13 need to notice it up. I don't think I want any 
14 information from Mr. Pilcher again, 'cause we got his 
15 numbers, but I mean, you're certainly entitled to present 
16 something if you want to. 
17 But I—I really am not probably going to listen 
18 to what you think the others say and try and make a 
19 conclusion from that. 
20 MR. NUNLEY: Well— 
21 THE COURT: Because going through 
22 your filter might not be accurate. 
23 MR. NUNLEY: —okay. Well, then, how 
24 about if he submits like a tax—a tax return that proved 
25 he made, you know, $18,000 a month. 
25 
1 THE COURT: Well, I don't think he 
2 ever asserted that. He said in these months that you— 
3 MR. NUNLEY: Or approximately, okay? 
4 THE COURT: —you were kind enough to 
5 hit him with a baseball bat in the knee and make it so he 
6 couldn't work, he lost that kind of income. He said that 
7 during those times, he didn't say, you know, he had—but 
8 I think he has billables there that show a time when he 
9 did less work, that that's what he got. 
10 That's why I'm comfortable with the substance 
11 of what he's given me; but if you have somebody who's got 
12 a contradictory view, I guess I'm happy to hear that, but 
13 I guess we need to have a notice, we need to know when 
14 we're going to be able to do that. And I guess you need 
15 to know that they need to be told to come. 
16 MR. NUNLEY: Well, that's— 
17 THE COURT: And even Mr. Heineman may 
18 take them in and talk about* how you're going to proceed, 
19 Anything else, Mr. Walsh? 
20 J (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
21 
22 | * * * 
23 
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25 
26 
Addendum C 
T h i r d D i s t r i c t C o u r t , S t a t e o f U t a h 
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Addendum D 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 78-3-201 
PART 2 
SENTENCING 
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences al-
lowed — Civil penalties — Restitution — 
Hearing — Definitions. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the 
defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for 
which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentenc-
ing court with or without an admission of committing the 
criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, 
but not general damages, which a person could recover 
against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the 
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal ac-
tivities and includes the money equivalent of property 
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses 
including earnings and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal pay-
ment for pecuniary damages to a victim, including the 
accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, insured 
damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental 
entity for extradition or transportation and as further 
denned in Subsection (4Xc). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court de-
termines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result 
of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in 
the defendant's criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may 
sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of the 
following sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private 
office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided 
by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without 
parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority 
conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity 
that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition 
to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall 
order that the defendant make restitution to victims 
of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct 
for which the defendant has agreed to make restitu-
tion as part of a plea agreement. For purposes of 
restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in 
Subsection (lXe). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropri-
ate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures 
as provided in Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitu-
tion, the clerk of the court shall enter an order of 
complete restitution as defined in Subsection (8)* b) on 
the civil judgment docket and provide notice of the 
order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment en-
forceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and the person in whose favor the restitution order is 
entered may seek enforcement of the restitution 
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In addition, the Department of Correc-
tions may, on behalf of the person in whose favor the 
restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for 
payment of restitution and the victim or department 
elects to pursue collection of the order by civil process, 
the victim shall be entitled to recover reasonable 
attorney's fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a 
lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall 
have the same effect and is subject to the same rules 
as a judgment for money in a civil action. Interest 
shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of 
sentencing. 
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make 
rules permitting the restitution payments to be cred-
ited to principal first and the remainder of payments 
credited to interest in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state 
under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve 
pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal 
activity in the county to which he has been returned, 
the court may, in addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, order that the defendant make restitu-
tion for costs expended by any governmental entity 
for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropri-
ate, the court shall consider the criteria in Subsection 
(4X0. 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall deter-
mine complete restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution nec-
essary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by 
the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitu-
tion the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the 
defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at 
the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered resti-
tution shall be determined as provided in Subsection 
(8). 
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(d) (1) If the court determines that restitution is appro-
priate or inappropnate under this subsection, the 
court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of 
the court record 
(n) In any civil action brought by a victim to 
enforce the judgment, the defendant shall be entitled 
to offset any amounts that have been paid as part of 
court-ordered restitution to the victim 
(in) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a 
lien when recorded m a judgment docket and shall 
have the same effect and is subject to the same rules 
as a judgment for money in a civil action Interest 
shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of 
sentencing 
Civ) The Department of Corrections shall make 
rules permitting the restitution payments to be cred-
ited to principal first and the remainder of payments 
credited to interest in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, 
or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the 
time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on 
the issue 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may 
impose, the court shall order the defendant to pay resti-
tution of governmental transportation expenses if the 
defendant was 
d) transported pursuant to court order from one 
county to another within the state at governmental 
expense to resolve pending cnminal charges, 
(n) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C 
misdemeanor, and 
(m) convicted of a crime 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay 
restitution of governmental transportation expenses if 
any of the following apply 
d) the defendant is charged with an infraction or 
on a subsequent failure to appear a warrant is issued 
for an infraction, or 
(n) the defendant was not transported pursuant to 
a court order 
(c) (\) Restitution of governmental transportation ex-
penses under Subsection (5Xa)(i) shall be calculated 
according to the following schedule 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is 
transported, 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is 
transported, and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is 
transported 
(n) The schedule of restitution under Subsection 
(5)(c)( I ) applies to each defendant transported regard-
less of the number of defendants actually transported 
in a single trip 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was con-
victed mandates that one of three stated minimum terms 
shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the 
term of middle seventy unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party 
mav submit a statement identifying circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts 
If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed with the 
court and served on the opposing party at least four days 
prior to the time set for sentencing 
(c> In determining whether there are circumstances 
that justift imposition of the highest or lowest term, the 
court mav consider the record in the case, the probation 
officer s report other reports, including reports received 
under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or 
mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, 
and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing 
hearing 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts 
supporting and reasons for imposing the upper or lower 
term 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall 
consider sentencing guidelines regarding aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing 
Commission 
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child 
kidnaping, rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon 
a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the defendant causes 
substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is set 
forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the 
defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the 
defendant shall be sentenced to the highest minimum term in 
state prison This subsection takes precedence over any con-
flicting provision of law 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an 
offense, the offense shall include any cnminal conduct 
admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to 
which the defendant agrees to pay restitution A victim of 
an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a 
conspiracy, or a pattern of cnminal activity, includes any 
person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal con-
duct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other condi-
tions for complete restitution, the court shall consider all 
relevant facts, including 
d) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense 
resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of prop-
erty of a victim of the offense, 
(n) the cost of necessary medical and related pro-
fessional services and devices relating to physical, 
psychiatnc, and psychological care, including non-
medical care and treatment rendered m accordance 
with a method of healing recognized by the law of the 
place of treatment, the cost of necessary physical and 
occupational therapy and rehabilitation, and the in-
come lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim, and 
(in) the cost of necessary funeral and related ser-
vices if the offense resulted in the death of a victim 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other condi-
tions for court-ordered restitution, the court shall con-
sider the factors listed in Subsection (8Kb) and 
d) the financial resources of the defendant and the 
burden that payment of restitution will impose, with 
regard to the other obligations of the defendant, 
(n) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution 
on an installment basis or on other conditions to be 
fixed by the court, 
(in) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of 
the payment of restitution and the method of pay-
ment, and 
(IV) other circumstances which the court deter-
mines make restitution inappropnate 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may 
defer entenng an order of restitution if the court deter-
mines that the complication and prolongation of the 
sentencing process, as a result of considenng an order of 
restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs 
the need to provide restitution to the victim 1999 
76-3-201.1. Collection of criminal judgment accounts 
receivable. 
(1) As used in this section 
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76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where conviction or 
prior sentence set aside. 
(1) Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on 
direct review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose 
a new sentence for the same offense or for a different offense 
based on the same conduct which is more severe than the prior 
sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously 
satisfied 
(2) This section does not apply when 
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which were 
not known to the court at the time of the original sen-
tence, and the court affirmatively places on the record the 
facts which provide the basis for the increased sentence, 
or 
(b) a defendant enters into a plea agreement with the 
prosecution and later successfully moves to invalidate his 
conviction, in which case the defendant and the prosecu-
tion stand in the same position as though the plea 
bargain, conviction, and sentence had never occurred 
1997 
77-18-L Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abey-
ance — Probation — Supervision — Presen-
tence investigation — Standards — Confiden-
tiality — Terms and conditions — Restitution 
— Termination, revocation, modification, or 
extension — Hearings — Electronic monitor-
ing. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant 
in conjunction with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court 
may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77, Chapter 
2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in 
abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no 
contest, or conviction of any crime or offense, the court 
may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and 
place the defendant on probation. The court may place the 
defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the De-
partment of Corrections except in cases of class C 
misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local govern-
ment or with a private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court, 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the 
supervision of the department is with the depart-
ment. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court is vested as or-
dered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all 
probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and 
presentence investigation standards for all individuals 
referred to the department. These standards shall be 
based on: 
(i) the type of offense,* 
(ii) the demand for services; 
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(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to 
determine what level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards 
shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and the Board 
of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and 
comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall 
establish procedures to implement the supervision and 
investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall 
annually consider modifications to the standards based 
upon criteria in Subsection (3Xa) and other criteria as 
they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall 
annually prepare an impact report and submit it to the 
appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the depart-
ment is not required to supervise the probation of persons 
convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to 
conduct presentence investigation reports on class C misde-
meanors or infractions. However, the department may super-
vise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance 
with department standards. 
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court 
may, with the concurrence of the defendant, continue the 
date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period 
of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence inves-
tigation report from the department or information from 
other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a 
victim impact statement describing the effect of the crime 
on the victim and the victim's family. The victim impact 
statement shall: 
(i) identify the victim of the offense; 
(ii) include a specific statement of the recom-
mended amount of complete restitution as defined in 
Subsection 76-3-201(4), accompanied by a recommen-
dation from the department regarding the payment of 
court-ordered restitution as defined in Subsection 
76-3-201(4) by the defendant; 
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the 
victim as a result of the offense along with its 
seriousness and permanence; 
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal 
welfare or familial relationships as a result of the 
offense; 
(v) identify any request for psychological services 
initiated by the victim or the victim's family as a 
result of the offense; and 
(vi) contain any other information related to the 
impact of the offense upon the victim or the victim's 
family that is relevant to the trial court's sentencing 
determination. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a 
specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by 
a recommendation from the department regarding the 
payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in 
accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4). 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation re-
port, including any diagnostic evaluation report ordered 
by the court under Section 76-3-404, are protected and are 
not available except by court order for purposes of sen-
tencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for 
use by the department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence in-
and the court for review, three working days prior to 
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence 
investigation report, which have not been resolved by the 
parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be 
brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the 
judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve 
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the depart-
ment. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be 
resolved, the court shall make a determination of rel-
evance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the 
presentence investigation report at the time of sentenc-
ing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any 
testimony, evidence, or information the defendant or the 
prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appro-
priate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall 
be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the 
defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the 
court may require that the defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at 
the time of being placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 
32a, Defense Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose 
support he is legally liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in 
a county jail designated by the department, after 
considering any recommendation by the court as to 
which jail the court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may 
include the use of electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitu-
tion programs, including the compensatory service 
program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, 
and treatment services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or 
victims with interest in accordance with Subsection 
76-3-201(4); and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the 
court considers appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain * 
high school graduation diploma, a GED certificate, of 
a vocational certificate at the defendant's own e** 
pense if the defendant has not received the diploma 
GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to 
being placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to ob-
tain one of the items listed in Subsection (8)(b^ 
because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the accoun 
receivable as defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest an° 
any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that peno° 
in accordance with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and . 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the cou 
orders supervised probation and any extension of W 
period by the department in accordance with Subsecti0 
77-18-1(10). , e 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at t^ 
discretion of the court or upon completion witho ^ 
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misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions, 
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the 
probation period under Subsection (10)(a)(i), 
there remains an unpaid balance upon the ac-
count receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, 
the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and 
continue the defendant on bench probation for 
the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of 
the account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the 
court shall record in the registry of civil judg-
ments any unpaid balance not already recorded 
and immediately transfer responsibility to collect 
the account to the Office of State Debt Collection. 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Col-
lection, prosecutor, victim, or upon its own motion, 
the court may require the defendant to show cause 
why his failure to pay should not be treated as 
contempt of court. 
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing 
court, the Office of State Debt Collection, and the 
prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all 
cases when termination of supervised probation will 
occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation 
progress report and complete report of details on 
outstanding accounts receivable. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of 
confinement after having been charged with a proba-
tion violation and prior to a hearing to revoke proba-
tion does not constitute service of time toward the 
total probation term unless the probationer is exon-
erated at a hearing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a 
hearing or decision concerning revocation of proba-
tion does not constitute service of time toward the 
total probation term unless the probationer is exon-
erated at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon 
the filing of a violation report with the court alleging a 
violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon 
the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the 
court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended 
except upon waiver of a hearing by the probationer or 
upon a hearing and a finding in court that the 
probationer has violated the conditions o^probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a 
hearing in court and a finding that the conditions of 
probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with 
particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of 
the conditions of probation, the court that authorized 
probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes 
probable cause to believe that revocation, modifica-
tion, or extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If thejiourt determines there is probable cause, 
it shall cause to be served on the defendant a warrant 
for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to 
show cause why his probation should not be revoked, 
modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and 
place for the hearing and shall be served upon the 
defendant at least five days prior to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a 
continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the 
defendant of a right to be represented by counsel at 
the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if 
he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a 
right to present evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or 
deny the allegations of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the 
affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall present evi-
dence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse informa-
tion on which the allegations are based shall be 
presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the 
defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise 
orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and 
speak in his own behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings 
of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the 
conditions of probation, the court may order the 
probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the 
entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be 
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall 
be executed. 
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter and interest 
accruing in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4) is consid-
ered a debt for willful and malicious injury for purposes of 
exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as provided in 
Title 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, 1985. 
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself 
to the custody of the Division of Mental Health for treatment 
at the Utah State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay 
of sentence, only after the superintendent of the Utah State 
Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit 
from treatment at the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the 
defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g) 
are receiving priority for treatment over the defendants 
described in this Subsection (14). 
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presen-
tence diagnostic evaluations, are classified protected in accor-
dance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access 
and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63-2-403 and 
63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for 
disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section, 
the department may disclose the presentence investigation 
only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-
202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other 
agency approved by the department for purposes of su-
pervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investi-
gation report or the subject's authorized representative; 
or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the 
presentence investigation report or the victim's autho-
rized representative, provided that the disclosure to the 
victim shall include only information relating to state-
ments or materials provided by the victim, to the circum-
stances of the crime including statements by the defen-
dant, or to the impact of the crime on the victim or the 
victim's household. 
(16) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a 
condition of probation under the supervision of the de-
partment, except as provided in Sections 76-3-406 and 
76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and 
standards for home confinement, including electronic 
monitoring, for all individuals referred to the department 
in accordance with Subsection (17). 
(17) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation 
under this section, it may order the defendant to partici-
pate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring as described in this section until further order 
of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the depart-
ment and the appropriate law enforcement unit of the 
defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used un-
der conditions which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring 
device at all times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the 
defendant, so that the defendant's compliance with 
the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home 
confinement through electronic monitoring as a condition 
9f probation under this section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the 
supervision of the Department of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic 
monitoring device on the defendant and install elec-
tronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the 
defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated 
with home confinement to the department or the 
program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confine-
ment through electronic monitoring only for those persons 
who have been determined to be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic moni-
toring described in this section either directly or by 
contract with a private provider. 1999 
